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The paper presents the basic byte level interpretation of an X.509 v3 digital certificate ac-
cording to ASN.1 DER/BER encoding. The reasons for byte level analysis are various and 
important. For instance, a research paper has mentioned how a PKI security may be violated 
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ASN.1 – Abstract Syntax Notation 1 
ASN.1 is a sort artificial language used 
for describing data and data structure, instead 
of programs. The syntax is standardized in 
ISO/IEC 8824, and the coding rules are de-
fined by ISO/IEC 8825. Both of these stan-
dards were developed from Recommendation 
X.409 of the CCITT. In order to get more in-
formation about ASN.1 it is recommended to 
consult [1]. In ASN.1, an octet is an eight-bit 
unsigned integer. Bit 8 of the octet is the 
most significant and bit 1 is the least signifi-
cant. 
The following meta-syntax and rules are used 
for in describing ASN.1 notation: 
 BIT – mono-space denotes literal charac-
ters in the type and value notation; in exam-
ples, it generally denotes an octet value in 
hexadecimal 
 n1 – bold italics denotes a variable 
 []  – bold square brackets indicate that a 
term is optional 
 {} – bold braces group related terms 
 |   – bold vertical bar delimits alternatives 
with a group 
 …  – bold ellipsis indicates repeated occur-
rences 
 = – bold equals sign expresses terms as 
sub-terms. 
 Layout is not significant; multiple spaces 
and line breaks can be considered as a single 
space 
  Identifiers (names of values and fields) and 
type references (names of types) consist of 
upper- and lower-case letters, digits, hy-
phens, and spaces; identifiers begin with 
lower-case letters; type references begin with 
upper-case letters. Comments are delimited 
by pairs of hyphens (--), or a pair of hyphens 
and a line break. 
Some of the data types used in ASN.1 are 
presented in the following listing: 
 
Data Type  Sort  Tag Number  Meaning 
BOOLEAN  Primitive 0x01 Boolean  value:  yes/no 
INTEGER  Primitive 0x02 Negative  and  positive  integers 
BIT  STRING  Primitive 0x03 Bit  sequence 
OCTET  STRING  Primitive 0x04 Byte  sequence (1 byte=8 bits=1octet) 
NULL  Primitive 0x05 A  null  value 
OBJECT IDEN-
TIFIER 
Primitive  0x06  An object identifier, which is a sequence of integer com-
ponents that identify an object such as an algorithm or 
attribute type 
PrintableString  Primitive  0x13  An arbitrary string of printable characters 
T61String  Primitive  0x14  An arbitrary string of T.61 (eight-bit) characters 
IA5String  Primitive  0x16  An arbitrary string of IA5 (ASCII) characters 








Some of structured types defined in ASN.1 are presented in the following listing: 
 
Data Type  Sort  Tag Num-
ber 
Meaning 
SEQUENCE  Constructed  0x30  An ordered collection of one or more types 
SEQUENCE OF  Constructed  0x10  An ordered collection of zero or more occurrences of a giv-
en type 
SET  Constructed  0x31  An unordered collection of one or more types 
SET OF  Constructed  0x11  An unordered collection of zero or more occurrences of a 
given type 
A0, A1, …  Constructed  0xAz  Where z = 0..F in hex and it represents the z-th element in 
SEQUENCE data type 
 
The idea in ASN.1 is to prefix each data ob-
ject with a unique label and information 
about its length. Users are allowed to define 
their own data types and nested data objects. 
A simple example of data type definition for 
a controller using ASN.1 is: 
SC_Controller ::= SEQUENCE { //Describe a new data type for a controller 
   Name IA5String,                  //The name of the microchip is an ASCII string 
   CPUType CPUPower,            //CPUType refers to the definition of CPUPower 
   NPU BOOLEAN,                   //yes or no if coprocessor is present 
   EEPROMSize INTEGER,        //the size in bytes of EEPROM 
   RAMSize INTEGER,              //the size in bytes of RAM used in smart card 
   ROMSize INTEGER               //the size in bytes of ROM used in smart card 
} 
CPUPower ::= ENUMERATED { //Definition of CPUPower as an enumeration 
   8Bit (8),                              //Possible selection values for the CPUType 
   16Bit (16), 
   32Bit (32) 
} 
An example for a particular XSS microcontroller using previous definition in ASN.1 is de-
scribed in the following mode: 
XSS SC_Controller ::= { //Specific instance-controller of SC_Controller 
   Name “XS 8 Bit”,              //The name of controller is XS 8 Bit 
   CPUType 8,                     //this is an 8-bit CPU 
   NPU true,                        //NPU present 
   EEPROMSize 1024,           //The size of EEPROM size is 1024 bytes 
   RAMSize 256,                  //The size of RAM size is 256 bytes 
   ROMSize 8192                 //The size of ROM size is 8192 bytes 
} 
The  BER – Basic Encoding Rules for 
ASN.1 are defined in the ISO/IEC 8825 
standard. A BER coded data object should 
have: 
 A label called T – tag 
 A length field L 
 The data content V - value 
 
Figure 1 presents the BER-based TLV cod-
ing principle accordingly to ASN.1: 
 
T - tag 
1-2 bytes 
L - length 
1-3 bytes 




Fig. 1. ASN.1 BER-based TLV coding 
 
A sample data for a particular microcontrol-
ler model is coded using the ASN.1 BER: 
0x30 0x1C 0x16 0x08 0x58 0x53 0x20 0x38 
0x20 0x42 0x69 0x74 0x0A 0x01 0x08 0x01 
0x01 0xFF 0x02 0x02 0x04 0x00 0x02 0x02 
0x01 0x00 0x02 0x02 0x20 0x00. Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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When the author discuss about the start of a 
sequence for an X509 v3 certificates, it 
would be 0x30 0x82 0x01 0xC3 - SE-
QUENCE {…} – this means the certificate is 
a SEQUENCE structure (first byte with 0x30 
value) with 451 bytes. The length is specified 
in 3 bytes 0x82 0x01 0xC3. The last hex digit 
(nibble = half-byte) from the first byte of the 
length field specifies the length in bytes of 
the structure => 2 bytes. The next 2 bytes ac-
tually express the length of the structure SE-
QUENCE, and they have the value 0x01C3 
=> 451 bytes. 
The BER special encoding applies to the 
OID-s – Object Identifiers - in Internet.  
In the figure 2 there is some of the ISO tree 
hierarchy for constructing objects in Internet 
structure. It is useful to imagine how would 
be written the OID with value 
1.2.840.113549.1.1.5 ({iso(1) member-
body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) 
pkcs-1(1) sha1-with-rsa-signature(5)}) for 
signature obtained from SHA-1 digest on the 
message and RSA algorithm applied to the 
digest. This encoding will be at byte level: 
0x06 0x09 0x2A 0x86 0x48 0x86 0xF7 0x0D 
0x01 0x01 0x05. The first byte shows that 
here there is an OID – OBJECT IDENTIFI-
ER field. The OID has 9 bytes length because 
of second byte in array. Because the first bit 
in length field is not set the length field has 
only one byte. The length field has value 9 
which means the OID structure has the payl-
oad data in 9 bytes.  
According to BER, the first two numbers of 
any OID (x.y) are encoded as one value using 
the formula (40*x)+y. The first two numbers 
in an OID are here 1.2. Therefore, the first 
two numbers of an OID are encoded as 42 or 
0x2A, because (40*1)+2 = 42. After the first 
two numbers are encoded, the subsequent 
numbers in the OID are each encoded as a 
byte. However, a special rule is required for 
large numbers because one byte (eight bits) 
can only represent a number from 0-255. 
This is the case for 840 and 113549. For 840 
from the OID, the first bit of the first byte 
should be set. The number occupies enough 
number of bytes till the last byte of represen-
tation is not having the first bit set. In 840 
case 0x48 has the first bit NOT set. So, the 
formula is the last hex digit from the first 
byte multiplied with 2^7 = 128 (1 bit is for 
multiple bytes representation) and added with 
the value from the second byte as long as the 
second byte has a value less than 0x80. In 
840 case, the formula is: 0x06*128 + 0x48 
(form 0x86 0x48)= 768 + 72 = 840. In case 
of 113549 we choose the bytes 0x86 0xF7 
0x0D because 0x0D is the last byte with first 
bit (sign bit) not set. The formula for 113549 
is: 
 
0x06*2^14 + 0x77*2^7 + 0x0d*2^0 = 
6*16384 + 119*128 + 13*1 = 98304 + 15232 
+ 13 = 113549.  
 
For the remaining encoding {…pkcs(1) pkcs-
1(1) sha1-with-rsa-signature(5)}, we will 
have only one byte for each number: 0x01 
0x01 0x05. 
’30 1C’                                       //Tag 0x30 for a array with a length of 28    
                                                 //bytes (0x1C) 
’16 08 58 53 20 38 20 42 69 74’   //Tag 0x16 for an IA5String with a length of  
                                                //8 bytes (0x08) with a content of “XS 8 Bit” 
‘0A 01 08’                                //Tag 0x0A for an enumerated data type with  
                                              //a length of 1 byte (0x01) and a content of 8 
’01 01 FF’       //Tag 0x01 for Boolean data type with a length of 1 byte (0x01)  
                     //and a content of 0xFF (true) 
’02 02 04 00’  //Tag 0x02 for an integer data type with a length of 2 bytes  
                    //(0x02) and of 1024 bytes (0x0400) 
’02 02 01 00’  //Tag 0x02 for an integer data type with a length of 2 bytes  
                    //(0x02) and of 256 bytes (0x0100) 
’02 02 20 00’ //Tag 0x02 for an integer data type with a length of 2 bytes  
                    //(0x02) and of 8192 bytes (0x0200) 




Fig. 2. ISO tree hierarchy for constructing objects in Internet structure 
 
For checking out an OID, please visit [3]. 
The DER – Distinguished Encoding Rules 
form a subset of the BER and give exactly 
one way to represent any ASN.1 value as an 
octet string. DER is intended for applications 
in which a unique octet string encoding is 
needed, as is the case when a digital signa-
ture is computed on an ASN.1 value. A basic 
summary of the BER and DER are found in 
Burton Kaliski [1]. 
The two most significant bits of the bytes T – 
tag encode the class of the data object. The 
bits positions are presented in figure 3: 
 
  T - tag 
b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 b0 
L - length 
Meaning 
  0   0  …  …  …  …  …  …
  0   1  …  …  …  …  …  …
  1   0  …  …  …  …  …  …
  1   1  …  …  …  …  …  …
 ...  …   0  …  …  …  …  …
 ...  …   1  …  …  …  …  …
 ...  …  …   Y  Y   Y   Y   Y 




 Universal class 
 Application class 
 Context-specific class 
 Private class 
 Primitive data object 
 Constructed data obj. 
 Tag code (0-30) 
 Pointer to the following   
 byte (byte 2), which   
 specifies the tag code 
b7 b6 b5 b4 b3 b2 b1 b0 
  0  …  …  …  …  …  …  …
  
 The value of tag code in    
 range 31-127 
  
Byte 1  Byte 2 
Meaning 
 One byte is needed 
 Two bytes are needed 
 Three bytes are  
 needed 
  
 0 - 127      …         … 
  0x81    128-255 
  0x82        256-65535 
Byte 1    Byte 2   Byte 3 
Byte 3,4,5 
 
Fig. 3. Structure of T and L fields in ASN.1 [5] 
 
In figure 3, the universal class indicates gen-
eral data objects such as integers and charac-
ter strings. The application class indicates 
that the data object belongs to a particular 
(e.g. electronic wallet from a smart card) or 
standard (e.g. ISO/IEC 7816-6) application. 
The classes context-specific and private are 
not matter of standard applications. The bit 
following the first two bits indicates if the tag 
is for a primitive or constructed data object. 
The five least significant bits from byte 1 are 
the actual label, the tag value. If the tag value Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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is greater then 30, then all the bits from first 
byte have value 1 and the bits b0-b6 from 
second byte store a value between 31-127 
ranges. The byte 3, 4 and 5 are used for 
marking the data length. If data has a byte 
length less than 127 then only the byte 3 
(first byte from L) is used to store the actual 
length. If the length value is between128-
255, then 2 bytes are used for storing the 
length and if the length is between 256 and 
65535, then all three bytes from L field are 
used for storing the length value. 
Figure 4 presents a sample about how the 
first name of a person can be stored in a 
smart-card. 
  Tag  Length  Value 
0x85  0x05  0x46  0x72  0x61  0x6E  0x6B 




First name “Frank” in ASCII 
 
Fig. 4. TLV Encoding for the first name “Frank” [5] 
 
Subsequent extensions to data structures can 
be undertaken very easily with ASN.1 since 
all that is necessary is to insert additional 
TLV-coded data objects into existing data 
structure. Full compatibility with the pre-
vious versions is retained as long as the pre-
vious TLV objects are not deleted. The same 
is true of new version of data structures in 
which changes have been made accordingly 
to the previous coding. This kind of encoding 
is used on the large scale in smart card indus-
try. Figure 5 presents a basic scheme for 
forming constructed TLV-coded data struc-
tures from several primitive TLV-coded data 
objects. 
 





Length of the 
constructed 
data object
Value of the 
constructed 
data object
Tp2  Tp3  Lp1  Vp1  Lp2  Vp2  Lp3  Vp3 
 
Fig. 5. Nested TLV-coded data objects [5] 
 
The indices ‘C’ and ‘P’ stand for ‘con-
structed’ and ‘primitive’ in figure 5. This 
kind of coding has the advantage of no mat-
ter order have the TLV-coding structures the 
programs could be able to interpret them cor-
rect. When evaluating the TLV-coding data 
structure, the program compares the first tag 
with all tags known to it. If it finds a match, 
then it recognizes the first object from byte 
array, and it is able to “say” how long it is. 
 
2. Digital Certificates and Certification 
Authorities 
The infrastructures based on the cryptogra-
phy with asymmetric (public) keys are essen-
tial for the viability of the message transac-
tions and communications especially in net-
works and generally on the Internet. The PKI 
– Public Key Infrastructure consists of the 
multitude of services required to be ensured 
when the technologies of encryption with 
public keys are used on a large scale. These 
services are of technological nature, as well 
as legal, and their existence is necessary in 
order to permit the exploitation of public 
keys technologies at their full capacity.  
The main elements of the public keys infra-
structures are: 
 Digital certificates 
 Certification Authorities (CA) 
 Management facilities (protocols) for cer-
tificates 
The public keys infrastructures must ensure 
support for encryption functions, as well as 
for those for digital signature. 
In the functioning of public keys systems is 
necessary a system for generating, circulating 
and certifying the users’ keys. Given a user C Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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who intents to pose as A, and wants to fake 
sign as. Faker C may easily do that, generat-
ing his own pair of keys and placing the pub-
lic one in the public folder, instead of the real 
one of A (instead of the public key of A).  
 
Digital Certificate  
Version
Serial Number
Crypto Algorithm for signature




ID unique of CA issue (optional)
ID unique of subject (optional)
Extensions (optional)
Digital signature of Certificate
Authority 
Type extension Critical/NonCritical Extenstion Value
Type extension Critical/NonCritical Extenstion Value
Type extension Critical/NonCritical Extenstion Value






Fig. 6. X509 v3 Certificate 
 
The documents and messages signed by C 
with his secret key will be verified with the 
public key that seems to be of A and any per-
son will be deceived the authenticity of the 
messages signed on behalf of A. The main 
problem is thus of the total trust in public 
keys, those used for certifying the digital sig-
natures. These (signatures) must be available 
on the network, so that any client may get the 
public key of a sender of a signed message. 
So, the technical solution exists: creating an 
international infrastructure, based on Certifi-
cation Authorities – CA, that may allow the 
easy access and in a secure mode to the pub-
lic keys of the entities that wish to communi-
cate in the network or Internet. These author-
ities will distribute, by request, certificates of 
authentic keys. The most largely known and 
used format for digital certificates of public 
keys is that defined in the standard X.509 by 
ISO/IEC/ITU. The format X.509 for certifi-
cates has evolved in three versions. Version 3 
(adopted in 1996) is the best known. Figure 6 
illustrates the format of the certificate X.509 
v3. 
While the previous versions ensured support 
only for the name system X.500, X.509 v3 
accepts a large variety of forms for names, 
including e-mail addresses and URLs. 
A system based on public keys certificates 
presumes the existence of a Certification Au-
thority, which issues certificates for a certain 
group of owners of keys pairs (public and 
private). Each certificate includes the value 
of the public key and information that uni-
quely identifies. The certificate’s subject 
(who is a private person or a company, an 
application, a device or another entity that 
holds the secret key correspondent to the 
public key included in the certificate). The 
certificate represents a liaison impossible to 
falsify, between a public key and a certain 
attribute of its owner. The certificate is digi-
tally signed by a Certification Authority (cer-
tified by the government), that so confirms 
the subject’s identity. Once the certificates 
set established, an user of that public key in-
frastructure (PKI) may obtain the public key 
for any user certified by that Certification 
Authority, simply getting the certificate for 
that user extracting from it the desired public 
key. The ASN.1 representation of an 
X509.v3 certificate is the following: Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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In figure 7 is represented an X 509 v3 cer-
tificate in hex editor and in Windows 
Crypto Shell program. 
 
Fig. 7. X509 v3 Certificate in Hex and in MS Crypto Shell 
 
So the interpretation of the results for a  Self Signed X509 V3 Certificate in ASN.1 
Certificate ::= SIGNED { SEQUENCE { 







issuerUniqueIdentifier [1] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
-- if present, version shall be v2 or v3 
subjectUniqueIdentifier [2] IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, 
-- if present, version shall be v2 or v3 
extensions [3] Extensions OPTIONAL 
-- If present, version shall be v3 -- } } 
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) } 
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER 
AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { 
algorithm ALGORITHM.&id ({SupportedAlgorithms}), 
parameters ALGORITHM.&Type ({SupportedAlgorithms}{ @algorithm}) OPTIONAL } 
-- Definition of the following information object set is deferred, perhaps to standardized 
-- profiles or to protocol implementation conformance statements. The set is required to 
-- specify a table constraint on the parameters component of AlgorithmIdentifier. 
-- SupportedAlgorithms ALGORITHM ::= { ... } 
Validity ::= SEQUENCE { 
notBefore Time, 
notAfter Time } 
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 
algorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, 
subjectPublicKey BIT STRING } 
Time ::= CHOICE { 
utcTime UTCTime, 
generalizedTime GeneralizedTime } 
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension 
Extension ::= SEQUENCE { 
extnId EXTENSION.&id ({ExtensionSet}), 
critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE, 
extnValue OCTET STRING 
-- contains a DER encoding of a value of type &ExtnType 
-- for the extension object identified by extnId -- } 
ExtensionSet EXTENSION ::= { ... } Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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BER is in the following listing [4]: 
 
Tag  Length  Value  ASN 1 Notation  Comments 
30  82 01 C3    SEQUENCE { 
 
Byte with value 0x30 is ASN 1 header, complex 
sequence, the the last digit from the first byte of 
the length bytes specifies the length in bytes of 
the structure => 2 bytes with 01C3 value => 451 
bytes 
30  82 01 2C    SEQUENCE { 
 
ASN Complex Sequence Header with 300 bytes 
length, to be signed parts begin here  
A0 03    [0]  { 
 
ASN 1 DER Encoding for first element from the 
SEQUENCE, has 3 bytes length. Tag 0x0A for 
an enumerated data type with a length of 3 bytes 
(0x03) and a content 0x02 0x01 0x02 
02 01  02  INTEGER  2 
} 
Attribute version, 1 byte length with value 2 => 
X 509 version 3 (starting from 0) 
02  04  46 8B 83 64  INTEGER 1183548260 
 
Attribute Serial Number with the value 
1183548260 
30 0D    SEQUENCE  {  Another  sequence  within first two sequences al-
ready opened and has 13 bytes length 




(1 2 840 113549 1 1 5) 
 
Signature algorithm identifier - sha1RSA = sha-
1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsad-
si(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) sha1-with-rsa-
signature(5)} 
For 840 from the OID the formula is 
0x06*128 + 0x48 (form 0x86 0x48)= 768 + 72 
= 840 
0x06*2^14 + 0x77*2^7 + 0x0d*2^0 = 6*16384 
+ 119*128 + 13*1 = 98304 + 15232 + 13 = 
113549 
05 00    NULL 
} 
Element NULL in ASN.1 BER with 0 bytes 
length. So, NULL 2 bytes and the SEQUENCE 
is ending. 
30 26    SEQUENCE  {  Another  sequence  within first three sequences 
already opened and has 38 bytes length (0x26) 
31  0B    SET {  A SET with 12 bytes length 
30 09    SEQUENCE  {   
06  03  55 04 06  OBJECT  IDENTIFIER 
countryName (2 5 4 6) 
OID countryName {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) attri-
buteType(4) countryName(6)} 
13 02  52  4F  PrintableString  'RO'  countryName = 'RO' Printable string with 2 
bytes length for issuer 
       } 
} 
Closed the SET and the SEQUENCE 
31  17    SET {  A SET with 23 bytes length 
30 15    SEQUENCE  {  Another  sequence  within first three sequences 
already opened and has 21 bytes length (0x15) 
06  03  55 04 03  OBJECT  IDENTIFIER 
commonName (2 5 4 3) 
OID commonName {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) at-
tributeType(4) commonName(3)} 
13  0E  4F 52 41 4E 47 45 20 
52 6f 6d 61 6e 69 61 
PrintableString 
'ORANGE Romania' 
commonName = 'ORANGE Romania' for issuer 
Printable String with 14 bytes length 
        } 
 } 
} 
Closed the SET and the SEQUENCE and the 
first above SEQUENCE – the one with 38 bytes 
length (0x26) for issuer 
30  1E    SEQUENCE {  Another sequence within first sequence already 
opened and has 30 bytes length (0x15) 
17  0D  30 37 30 37 30 34 31 
31 32 34 32 30 5a 
UTCTime 
'070704112420Z' 
A "coordinated universal time" or Greenwich 
Mean Time (GMT) value, for valid from 
YYMMDDHHmmSS format, meaning 04 July 
2007 11:24:20 
17  0D  30 37 31 30 30 32 31 
31 32 34 32 30 5a 
UTCTime 
'071002112420Z' 
A "coordinated universal time" or Greenwich 
Mean Time (GMT) value, for valid to 
YYMMDDHHmmSS format, meaning 02 Oc-
tober 2007 11:24:20 
      }  Closed the SEQUENCE with 0x1E length Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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30  26    SEQUENCE {  Another sequence within first sequence already 
opened and has 38 bytes length (0x26) 
31  0B    SET {  A SET with 11 bytes length 
30  09    SEQUENCE  {  Another sequence within first two sequences 
and one set already opened and has 09 bytes 
length 
06  03  55 04 06  OBJECT  IDENTIFIER 
countryName (2 5 4 6) 
OID countryName {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) attri-
buteType(4) countryName(6)} 
13 02  52  4F  PrintableString  'RO'  countryName = 'RO' Printable string with 2 
bytes length for subject 
       } 
} 
End of SEQUENCE and SET 
31  17    SET {  A SET with 23 bytes length 
30 15    SEQUENCE  {  Another  sequence  within first three sequences 
already opened and has 21 bytes length (0x15) 
06  03  55 04 03  OBJECT  IDENTIFIER 
commonName (2 5 4 3) 
OID commonName {joint-iso-itu-t(2) ds(5) at-
tributeType(4) commonName(3)} 
13  0E  4F 52 41 4E 47 45 20 
52 6f 6d 61 6e 69 61 
PrintableString 
'ORANGE Romania' 
commonName = 'ORANGE Romania', for sub-
ject Printable String with 14 bytes length 
        } 
 } 
} 
Closed the SET and the SEQUENCE and the 
first above SEQUENCE – the one with 38 bytes 
length (0x26) for subject 
30  81 9F    SEQUENCE {  Another sequence within first sequence already 
opened and has 159 bytes length (0x9F) 
30 0D    SEQUENCE  {  Another  sequence  within first two sequences al-
ready opened and has 13 bytes length 




(1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 
 
OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption ::= 
{iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) 
pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) rsaEncryption(1)} 
 
05 00    NULL 
} 
Element NULL in ASN.1 BER with 0 bytes 
length. So, NULL 2 bytes and the SEQUENCE 
is ending. 
03  81 8D  00 30 81 89 02 81 81 
00 b6 31 f8 3c cf 87 
50 8b 30 48 95 65 81 
2b 64 03 21 c4 43 4d 
a7 f9 eb 4b 67 ff e7 ec 
65 76 4b bd ca d4 43 
5d a6 92 d5 86 9d 4e 
0b 4c cb 5b 08 33 41 
9a 62 2f 7e 26 13 95 
58 f2 01 9a 67 33 3e 
d1 c5 af 6f 89 6e e5 
54 0b 2e f9 95 24 7d 
4f 1c 31 ac b6 bd fe 
45 2b da f9 21 ec 9d 
42 9f 5f 62 2e c4 51 
36 7e 00 59 eb b4 04 
91 7f c4 f5 4c 2f bf 6a 
8f 94 62 9d a5 20 4d 
2f c0 2e a2 02 ed c5 ef 
02 03 01 00 01 
BIT STRING 0 unused 
bits, encapsulates { 
BIT STRING with 141 bytes length for RSA 
Public Key. The second byte is the sequence 
(0x30), the third and fourth byte are the length 
of RSA public key, 0x0189. The fith byte speci-
fies an INTEGER of 0x181 bytes length. This is 
the length of the RSA modulus. After RSA 
modulus, comes the RSA public exponent. In 
this case, the RSA public exponent is 0x01 0x01 
0x01 (the last 3 bytes).  
      }  End BIT STRING 
30 0D    SEQUENCE  {  Another  sequence  within first two sequences al-
ready opened and has 13 bytes length 




(1 2 840 113549 1 1 5) 
 
Signature algorithm identifier - sha1RSA = sha-
1WithRSAEncryption OBJECT IDENTIFIER 
::= {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsad-
si(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) sha1-with-rsa-
signature(5)} 
05 00    NULL 
} 
Element NULL in ASN.1 BER with 0 bytes 
length. So, NULL 2 bytes and the SEQUENCE 
is ending. 
03  81 81  00 08 d5 29 b4 97 e0 
cf 6b fd bf f0 00 ce b3 
BIT STRING 0 unused 
bits, encapsulates { 
BIT STRING with 129 bytes length - 1024 bits - 
for digital signature of Certificates Authority. Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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89 3c 7a 7c f2 95 23 
1c a2 56 ca 09 04 b6 
74 d3 f5 84 15 ff cc 03 
1e 2a b4 69 ac 83 42 
03 c7 b6 d1 a0 e1 51 
8c eb a1 3f 32 53 89 
ee 5b ae 72 6e a6 16 
ac 88 77 38 23 cb bc 
8e 15 7f 36 4f 8c 92 
4d e9 53 96 0b 08 c9 
cd 92 fd 46 fc 9e 05 
11 bd ba cb 6f 30 53 
e8 94 48 45 84 68 c8 
ba c1 57 89 75 a1 32 
f2 35 01 1b e7 17 87 
9c b7 6d 8b eb af 7a 
9a 
This certificate is self signed and the signature is 
generated with itself private key. In this case all 
the previous fields from the certificate has been 
concatenated and signed with the private key 
and can be verified with itself public key. 
        } 
 } 
} 
End BIT STRING 
End SEQUENCE with 0x81 0x9F length 
End SEQUENCE with 82 0x01 0xC3 length 
 
So, from the previous table it is obvious the 
following for the X509 v3 self signed certifi-
cate: 
 the serial number is 1183548260 (0x46 
0x8B 0x83 0x64 hex); 
 the certificate is signed with RSA over the 
SHA-1 hash algorithm; 
 the issuer's distinguished name is CN = 
ORANGE Romania; C = RO; 
 the subject's distinguished name is CN = 
ORANGE Romania; C = RO; 
 the issuer and the subject are the same, so 
the certificate is self signed; 
 the certificate was issued on July 04, 2007 
11:24:20 and will expire on October 02, 2007 
11:24:20; 
 the certificate contains a 1024 bit RSA 
public key; 
 the certificate contains the signature of all 
the fields in last section 
The obtained ASN.1 Notation for the certifi-
cate from the previous listing of the self 
signed certificate is [4]: 
 
SEQUENCE { 
  SEQUENCE { 
    [0] { 
      INTEGER 2 
  } 
  INTEGER 1183548260 
  SEQUENCE { 
    OBJECT IDENTIFIER      
    rsaWithSha1(1.2.840.113549.1.1.5) 
        NULL 
  } 
  SEQUENCE { 
     SET { 
       SEQUENCE { 
         OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2.5.4.6) 
         PrintableString ‘RO’ 
       } 
    } 
    SET { 
     SEQUENCE { 
        OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2.5.4.3) 
        PrintableString ‘ORANGE Romania’ 
      } 
    } 
  } 
  SEQUENCE { 
     UTCTime ‘070704112420Z’ 
     UTCTime ‘071002112420Z’ 
  } 
  SEQUENCE { 
     SET { 
        SEQUENCE { 
             OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2.5.4.6) 
             PrintableString ‘RO’ 
         } 
      } 
      SET { 
         SEQUENCE { 
              OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2.5.4.3) 
              PrintableString ‘ORANGE Romania’ 
         } 
      } 
  } 
 SEQUENCE { 
    SEQUENCE { 
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1.2.840.11354 
         9.1.1.1) 
      NULL 
    } 
    BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { //public 
         key} 
    SEQUENCE { 
      OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaWithSha1 (1.2.840.113549 
          .1.1.5) 
      NULL 
    } 
    BIT STRING 0 unused bits, encapsulates { //signat 
          ure} 
  } 
} Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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The systems for obtaining public keys based 
on certificates are simple and cheap to im-
plement, due to an important characteristic of 
the digital certificates: the certificates may be 
distributed without requiring protection 
through the average security systems (certifi-
cation, integrity and confidentiality). This 
because the public key should not be kept se-
cret; thus, the digital certificate that includes 
it is not secret. There are no requirements for 
certification or integrity, because the certifi-
cate self-protects (the digital signature of AC 
in the certificate ensures its certification, as 
well as its integrity). 
Consequently, the digital certificates may be 
distributed and moved by unsecured commu-
nication liaisons: by unsecured file servers, 
by systems of unsecured folders and/or 
communication protocols that do not endure 
the security. 
 
3. Protocols for Certificates Management 
The interaction between the components of a 
public key infrastructure requires the exis-
tence of some protocols for the certificates 
management. The elements involved in the 
PKI management are: 
 the subject of a certificate, that may be a 
person or an application and represents the 
final entity (EE – End Entity); 
 Certification Authority – CA, that starts a 
digital certificate, coupling the identity of an 
user with his public key and certifies this as-
sociation; 
 AI (Registration Authority – RA) – certifi-
cation of the persons, name deliverance key 
generation.  
The protocols between the mentioned above 
are used for the following scopes: 
 Establishing CA: when a new CA is estab-
lished, there must be taken certain steps, such 
as generating the initial list of revoked certif-
icates or the export of the CA’s public key. 
 Initializing the final entity: involves obtain-
ing the public key of the root CA and the in-
formation request about the PKI management 
at the level of the final entity 
 Certification: 
¾  Initial registration/certification – when 
an end entity becomes known to a Certifi-
cation Authority (CA). After this process 
CA generates one or more certificates for 
that end entity. 
¾  Establishing a pair of keys – it is neces-
sary that each pair of keys to be regularly 
changed and a new certificate to be issued. 
¾  Updating a certificate – when a certifi-
cate expires, it must be update. 
¾  Changing the CA’s pair of keys. 
¾  Request for crossed certificates – when 
a certification authority certifies another 
certification authority. 
¾  Updating some crossed certificates 
 Publishing of a certificate or list of revoked 
certificates: involves storing a certificate or a 
list of revoked certificates where everybody 
may have access (for instance such a protocol 
is LDAP). 
 Restoration of a pair of keys: when an end 
entity loses its private key and wishes resto-
ration, if previously RA or CA saved this 
key. 
 Revoking a certificate: when an end entity 
wishes to revoke (cancel) a certificate, opera-
tion that involves a revocation demand and 
implicitly the update of the list of revoked 
certificates (CRL – Certificate Revocation 
Lists). 
It is not necessary that these operations 
should be executed on-line, also existing off-
line methods for their fulfillment. It is im-
possible to find a Certification Authority 
which to issue certificates for all the owners 
of pairs of public/ private keys in the world, 
because it is not practical that all the users in 
the world trust a single organization or com-
pany in what concerns their secret communi-
cations. That is why is accepted the idea of 
the multiple Certification Authorities. More-
over, a single user can have certificates is-
sued by different CAs, for different types of 
secure communications he wants to establish. 
As well, practically it is not possible to pre-
sume that a users of the public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) already holds the public key of a 
certain certification authority, CA1, which is-
sued a certificate for an entity with whom 
that user wants to secure communicate. Al-
though, in order to obtain the public key of 
that CA1, the user may use another certifi-Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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cate, i.e. a certificate issued for that CA1 by 
another certification authority, CA2, whose 
public key is hold in a secure way by the us-
er. So, the procedure is recursively applied 
and a user may obtain the public keys for a 
constantly larger number of Certification Au-
thorities and, correspondingly, the public 
keys for a constantly larger number of other 
users. This leads to a general pattern, called 
certification chain of certification path, on 
which are based all the main present systems 
for public keys distribution.  
The model of building the certification chain 
is reproduced in figure 8. 
 
Digital Certificate 1 
Digital Certificate 2 
User X 
Subject=AC2 




Public key of AC3 
Issuer=Certificate 
Authority AC2 
Digital Certificate 3 
Subject=User Y 
Public key of Y 
Issuer=Certificate 
Authority AC3 
User X obtains the public key of Y using a 
certification chain. X knows where to find 
the digital certificate1 and starting with it, 
find out the public key of Y. 
 
Fig. 8. Certification Chain 
 
 
Fig. 9. Digital Signature involving Digital Certificates 
 
The certification is so absolutely necessary in 
an infrastructure based on cryptography with 
public keys. But together with this come 
problems that must be solved, such as: certif-
icate acquisition, its recognition, revocation, 
distribution and validation. The description 
of a standard digital signature that involves 
public certificates is presented in figure 9. 
In figure 9 the sender A hashes the original 
message M. The digest is sent into the smart Informatica Economică vol. 13, no. 1/2009 
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card that process RSA with the private key 
stored in secure manner on the smart card. 
After the smart card processing the signature 
is attached to the original message using 
PKCS. The message with signature arrives to 
the receiver B. The receiver B gets the public 
key of A using a certification chain from the 
certificates stored on CA’s servers. The pub-
lic key of A and the signature are the inputs 
for RSA algorithm and it is obtained the di-
gest H2. The original message is hashed with 
a dispersion function (MD5 or SHA-1) and it 
is obtained H1. If H1 is the same as H2 then 
the signature is valid. 
     
4. Conclusions 
The study is important because it seems poss-
ible to have different certificates with the 
same signature value – last field in ASN.1 
sequence of a certificate. More information 
about collisions is in [2]. They “announce a 
method for the construction of pairs of valid 
X.509 certificates in which the ‘to be signed’ 
parts form a collision for the MD5 hash func-
tion. As a result the issuer signatures in the 
certificates will be the same when the issuer 
uses MD5 as its hash function”. Also, they 
show “that MD5 collisions can be crafted 
easily in such a way that the principles 
derlying the trust in Public Key Infrastructure 
are violated”. There is in research how a 
tificate trust may be violated by the exploited 
of MD5 collision over digital certificates. 
That’s why it is important to analysis at byte 
level of ASN.1 DER/BER encoding of the 
certificates and their implications in the 
lic key infrastructures. 
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